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We develop a model of statistical discrimination in criminal trials. Agents carry
publicly observable labels of no economic signiﬁcance (race, etc.) and choose to
commit crimes if their privately observed utility from doing so is high enough. A
crime generates noisy evidence, and defendants are convicted when the realized
amount of evidence is suﬃciently strong. Convicted oﬀenders are penalized either
by incarceration or by monetary ﬁnes. In the case of prison sentences, discrimi-
natory equilibria can exist in which members of one group face a prior prejudice
in trials and are convicted with less evidence than members of the other group.
Such discriminatory equilibria cannot exist with monetary ﬁnes instead of prison
sentences. Our ﬁndings have implications for potential reforms of the American
criminal justice system.
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1 Introduction
Criminal conviction rates in the United States diﬀer drastically across racial groups.
The jail incarceration rates for U.S. blacks, for example, is 800 people per 100,000,
while the rate for whites is 166 per 100,000. An estimated 12% of black males in
their late twenties were incarcerated in 2005, as opposed to 1.7% of white males.1
That these diﬀerences exist is undisputed. It is much less clear, however, why they
exist. One possible explanation is that blacks commit more crimes than whites. For
example, criminal participation tends to be correlated with economic characteristics
such as income, education, or area of residence, and these characteristics diﬀer across
racial groups. If this were the whole story, then empirical studies of the determinants of
crime should ﬁnd race to be insigniﬁcant once these other characteristics are controlled
for, and this is generally not the case.2 Another possibility is that the criminal justice
system is somehow “biased,” so that blacks are more easily convicted. This explanation,
however, begs some other questions. How could such a bias persist? And, what policy
implications are there?
Some papers have examined the issue of bias in the courts. Georgakopoulos (2004)
and Burke (2007) both consider the possibility that courts may have false beliefs about
a group’s proclivity for criminality. Georgakopoulos notes that such beliefs can lead to
greater arrest and conviction rates, which might reinforce such beliefs while Burke con-
siders the psychological basis for false beliefs in prosecutors and proposes practices and
institutions to prevent such cognitive bias from arising. Other papers have considered
racial proﬁling by the police. Examples include Knowles, Persico and Todd (2001),
Persico (2002), Alexeev and Leitzel (2004) and Bjerk (2007). These papers, however,
assume ex-ante diﬀerences in criminal behavior across racial subgroups; they are not
concerned with how such diﬀerence might come to be.
In this paper, we present a theoretical model of crime in which any and all diﬀerences
across groups, as well as judicial biases, arise as equilibrium results. We consider
an environment in which a judge or jury must determine whether a given amount
of evidence is suﬃcient to convict a defendant. This judge starts with prior beliefs
about the defendant’s guilt, which depends on observable characteristics such as income
or race, and uses the evidence to update these beliefs according to Bayes’ Rule. In
equilibrium, we impose that the judge’s prior beliefs are correct in that the probability
that the judge attaches to the defendant being guilty is exactly equal to the proportion
of the defendant’s type that commit crime. Suppose now that convicted oﬀenders are
1Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics Prison and Jail Inmates at Midyear 2005.
2See, for example, Bjerk (2006), Krivo and Peterson (1996), Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001),
and Trumbull (1989).
1sent to prison for a ﬁxed amount of time. Such a sentence punishes richer individuals
more severely than poorer ones, so that poorer individuals will be less deterred by
this punishment and hence be more willing to commit crimes. If, at the same time,
a person’s perceived proclivity to crime negatively aﬀects their earning opportunities,
one can see how a stereotyping equilibrium might arise in which members of diﬀerent
racial groups receive diﬀerent (but correct) prior beliefs regarding their guilt. Thus,
even with the same amount of evidence, the disadvantaged group will be more easily
convicted. Such a theory of discrimination is often associated with the term statistical
discrimination.
Statistical discrimination in the context of labor markets has been studied, for ex-
ample, in Phelps (1972), Arrow (1973), and Coate and Loury (1993).3 Our model is
diﬀerent from these in that we incorporate the role of the courts. Interestingly, the
policy implications of such a model diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the ones derived in labor-
market models. Coate and Loury (1993), for example, propose that negative stereotyp-
ing equilibria can be prevented through aﬃrmative action in the labor market. In our
framework, stereotyping equilibria can arise even if observed wages and employment
rates are the same for all individuals not in jail (this is done in a dynamic extension of
the model). Thus aﬃrmative action policies targeting the labor market may not have
the desired eﬀect. We identify an alternative remedy, namely the adoption of monetary
ﬁnes instead of incarceration as a means of punishment. Fines tend to punish poorer
persons more severely than richer ones, and hence act in the opposite way as prison
sentences. In particular, we show that they eliminate stereotyping equilibria. Thus,
our paper contributes to the literature on optimal sanctions, speciﬁcally on the use
of ﬁnes versus incarceration.4 We remark that in this paper we do not consider the
costs to either crime or corrections, and compare prison sentences and ﬁnes strictly
with respect to the discrimination question. Hence, our paper does not oﬀer a welfare
analysis, and neither is this our intent. There are many reasons, besides the potential
for biased outcomes, why one form of punishment may be preferable over another. For
instance, we abstract from the idea that a defendant might be “debt proof” (unable to
pay the ﬁne), a very practical reason that incarceration might be preferred. However,
we argue that, while ﬁnes may not be desirable (or even possible) for some crimes, this
is not the case for all crimes.
Related to our approach is a paper by Verdier and Zenou (2004), who examine a
model of statistical discrimination, location choice, and criminal activity. As in our
model, race serves as a coordination device in their paper, assigning diﬀerent rational
expectations equilibria to diﬀerent racial groups. However, their model is much diﬀerent
3The idea that economically meaningless events, such as racial labels, can coordinate individual
actions and social expectations is often referred to as a “sunspots theory”. Various related notions
have appeared in Cass and Shell (1983), Aumann (1987), Forges (1986), and Cartwright and Wooders
(2006), among others.
4See, for example, Becker (1968), Polinsky and Shavell (1984), Morris and Tonry (1990), Posner
(1992) and Levitt (1997).
2from ours in the nature of the equilibrium feedbacks between beliefs, criminal activity,
and economic variables. Discriminatory outcomes arise in Verdier and Zenou because
lower wages induce residential location choices closer to high-crime areas, and therefore
lower the cost of committing a crime. In our model, on the other hand, it is the fact
that imposed sentences aﬀect persons with diﬀerent incomes diﬀerently, which provides
the feedback from economic variables to criminal activity. Furthermore, jury bias is
an essential ingredient in our model that is absent in Verdier and Zenou: Here, not
only do racial groups diﬀer in their crime rates, but conditional on having committed
a crime a member of the disadvantaged group is more easily convicted. Finally, unlike
our paper, it is not possible in Verdier and Zenou’s model to generate a situation in
which all working persons have the same wage rate, and nevertheless there are ex-post
diﬀerences in crime rates across races.
We proceed as follows. Our theoretical model is developed in three steps. In Section
2, we assume (temporarily) that incomes are exogenously given and observable. In
Section 3, we derive a number of results results for this case. In Section 4, we do
away with the assumption that income is exogenous—instead, we introduce diﬀerent
(racial) groups which are ex-ante identical, and make each group’s income a function
of prejudice toward that group. We show that this can create discriminatory equilibria
if prison sentences are used as punishments, but not when ﬁnes are used. In Section
5, we consider two extensions of the model. First, by making the model dynamic we
demonstrate that group membership can predict crime even when per-period income
can not. As mentioned above, this result casts some doubt on the success of labor
market interventions to prevent statistical discrimination. Second, we examine the
case where an individual may be convicted of multiple oﬀenses, and show that the
intuition from the previous sections still hold even without interaction with the labor
market. Section 6 concludes with a few remarks. Most proofs are in the Appendix.
2 A Simple Model of Crime and Prejudice
In our model, an agent must decide whether to commit a crime, and a judge or jury must
decide whether to convict a defendant accused of committing a crime. We assume that
the agent is characterized by an exogenously given, publicly observable type w ∈ [w,∞),
with w > 0. The type w represents an agent’s wealth or income and may aﬀect the
jury’s beliefs.5
5The exogeneity of w is a temporary assumption—we will do away with it in due time and replace
it with ﬁxed and publicly observable race labels (that are not connected to payoﬀs except through the
behavior of agents). However, because race aﬀects prejudice through economic variables, we defer the
introduction of race until Section 4, and focus on economic variables in this section and the next.
32.1 Timing of events
The timing is as follows: First, the agent comes across an opportunity to commit a
crime. The beneﬁt to committing this crime is η ∈ [0,∞), which is privately observ-
able and drawn according to a continuous distribution Q with support [0,∞). This
distribution is assumed to be independent of w. After the agent observes η, he decides
whether to commit a crime (d = 1) or not (d = 0). If the crime is committed, the agent
receives the beneﬁt of the crime, η, and an investigation is initiated. If the agent does
not commit the crime, there is a probability λ ∈ (0,1) that an investigation is initiated
“by accident.” If this happens, the agent does not consume η but may still be found
guilty of the crime.
If under investigation, a random amount of evidence t ∈ [0,1] against the agent
will be discovered. In case a crime has in fact been committed, t is a random draw
from distribution F. In case of accidental investigation, t is drawn from distribution
G. We assume that F and G have support [0,1], are continuous with density f and
g, respectively, and that the ratio f(t)/g(t) increases strictly in t. A higher value of
t hence means stronger evidence against the agent. We further make the technical
assumptions that 0 < f(0) < ∞ and 0 < g(0) < ∞.
After the evidence is discovered, the agent has to stand trial and becomes a defen-
dant. At trial, a judge observes w as well as t and forms belief θ(w,t) = P[d = 1|w,t],
representing the probability of guilt of the agent. The agent is convicted of the crime if
θ(w,t) ≥ α, where α ∈ (0,1) represents the standard of proof. The interpretation of α
is that courts must determine whether or not the evidence establishes the defendant’s
guilt beyond a “reasonable doubt.” In our model, α quantiﬁes what is “reasonable.”
If the agent is not investigated, or if he is investigated and subsequently acquitted, he
receives utility u(w). Regarding the utility function u, we assume it is twice diﬀeren-
tiable with u0(w) > 0 and u00(w) ≤ 0. If the agent is convicted, he is sentenced to a
punishment which reduces his utility by ∆(w) on him. We will describe the possible
penalties available in more detail below. Figure 1 depicts the timing of events in a
“game tree” (the agent’s payoﬀs are given at the terminal nodes of the tree).
It is worth discussing our assumption about accidental investigations at this point.
From a technical perspective, it introduces the possibility that a person who faces trial
is innocent. If this possibility did not exist, the jury’s prior beliefs and the updating
problem would become trivial (every defendant would be guilty). From a conceptual
perspective, there are several interpretations. One is that the agent is charged with a
crime that has in fact happened, but which was committed by a third person. This
interpretation would introduce some complications to our model. For instance, it would
then be possible that one person can be convicted of two crimes, one that he committed
and one that he did not commit. This interpretation will be examined in Section 5.2.
Here, we consider a simpler model instead, in order to make the intuition for our results
clearer. The current model entails an agent who must decide whether to commit an act
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Figure 1: Timing of events
this applies to is tort law. For instance, damaging events may take place which may be
the result of negligence, or not, and at trial it must be determined whether the agent
should be held responsible. In the case of accidental torts, η can be interpreted as the
utility beneﬁt from not taking precautions; for intentional torts, η may represent some
other beneﬁt. Consider, for example, the case of a corporate bankruptcy which causes
losses to the shareholders. The bankruptcy can be the result of fraudulent actions on
part of the management, a crime that might have lead to greater income for those
involved, but it can also simply be the result of bad business decisions or unforeseen
shocks to the economic environment, neither of which would lead to liability on the
part of the management. The probability λ in the model would then represent the
probability of such unforeseen shocks and the subsequent investigation of the company’s
management.
2.2 Penalties
We now consider the diﬀerent forms of punishments more explicitly. A penalty schedule
is a mapping ρ : [w,∞) → [w,∞) such that ρ(w) ≤ w. When sentenced to a penalty ρ,
the agent’s wealth will be decreased by ρ(w). The utility loss to the agent is therefore
5∆(w) = u(w) − u(w − ρ(δ)). Listed below are a few important cases of penalties.
Imprisonment. If sentenced to prison, the agent’s wealth will be reduced to a uni-
formly low level w0, which is independent of the agent’s type outside of prison. Thus,
a prison sentence is given by the penalty schedule ρ(w) = w − w0. The utility loss to
the agent is therefore ∆(w) = u(w) − u(w0).
Simple ﬁne. If sentenced to pay a simple ﬁne, the agent’s wealth will be decreased by
a ﬁxed amount δ. This is described by the penalty schedule ρ(w) = δ, and the utility
loss to the agent is ∆(w) = u(w) − u(w − δ).
Proportional ﬁne. If sentenced to pay a proportional ﬁne, the agent’s wealth is
reduced by a fraction γ ∈ (0,1); thus ρ(w) = γw. The utility loss to the agent is
therefore ∆(w) = u(w) − u((1 − γ)w).
Since the utility loss ∆ depends on the type of punishment being used, diﬀerent
penalty forms have diﬀerent eﬀects on individuals of lower and higher income types.
In general, it depends on both the properties of the utility function u as well as on
properties of the penalty schedule ρ whether higher or lower types are penalized more
severely. However, if punishment is imprisonment, ∆ increases in w, so a prison sentence
clearly is a more severe punishment for higher types than it is for lower types. If the
punishment is a ﬁne δ, on the other hand, ∆ decreases in w as long as agents are
strictly risk averse. In this case, a simple ﬁne works exactly in the opposite direction
as a prison sentence.
2.3 Bayesian beliefs at trial
At trial, the judge forms the posterior belief θ(w,t) through Bayesian updating. Specif-
ically, let p(w) denote the judge’s prior belief that an individual of type w commits
a crime6. We will call p(w) the prejudice held against individuals of type w. The
Bayesian likelihood that the investigated individual of type w is guilty, conditioning on
evidence t, is then
θ(w,t) ≡ P[d = 1|w,t] =
p(w)f(t)
p(w)f(t) + λ(1 − p(w))g(t)
∈ [0,1]. (1)
Given that f(t)/g(t) increases, θ(w,t) increases in t and in p(w). For a ﬁxed α, let t(w)
be such that
α = θ(w,t(w));
t(w) is then the conviction threshold that is applied to individuals of type w. While α
is ﬁxed for all defendants, the amount of evidence t(w) required to prove guilt beyond
probability α can depend on income w.
6Note that this prior is not subjective. In equilibrium, it is equal to the probability that an individual
of type w actually commits a crime. As such, judges will not diﬀer in their priors.
62.4 The defendant’s decision
Let m1(w) denote the probability that an individual of type w is convicted conditional
on having committed the crime, and let m0(w) denote the probability that the same
individual is (wrongfully) convicted conditional on not having committed the act. The
crime is committed if and only if the beneﬁt from doing so exceeds its cost:
η > q(w) ≡ [m1(w) − m0(w)]∆(w),
where ∆(w) is the utility loss of the agent when punished, and the diﬀerence m1(w)−
m0(w) is the increase in the likelihood of suﬀering this loss when committing the crime.
The product q(w) = [m1(w) − m0(w)]∆(w) is then the expected cost of committing
the crime, so that the defendant decides to commit the act when the beneﬁt of doing
so, η, exceeds the expected cost, q(w). We can express the probability of conviction
following a crime from the agent’s perspective as
m1(w) = P[θ(w,t) ≥ α|d = 1] = P[t ≥ t(w)|d = 1] = 1 − F(t(w)),
and the probability of wrongful conviction as
m0(w) = λP[θ(w,t) ≥ α|d = 0] = λP[t ≥ t(w)|d = 0] = λ(1 − G(t(w))).
2.5 Rational expectations equilibrium
An equilibrium will be a tuple (p,q,t), where p : [w,∞) → [0,1] is the prior belief for the
judge, q : [w,∞) → [0,∞) is the decision threshold for the agent, and t : [w,∞) → [0,1]
is the conviction threshold; all of these are functions of the agent’s type. We call
(p∗,q∗,t∗) an equilibrium if it solves the following system of equations for all w:
p∗(w) = 1 − Q(q∗(w)), (2)
q∗(w) = [1 − F(t∗(w)) − λ(1 − G(t∗(w)))]∆(w), (3)
θ(w,t∗(w)) = α. (4)
Condition (2) says that in equilibrium, the prejudice toward a defendant of type w,
p∗(w), is consistent with the probability that agents of type w actually commit crimes.
Condition (3) says that the decision of a type w agent to commit a crime, given by
q∗(w), is optimal given the conviction thresholds t∗(w) applied to this agent. Condition
(4) says that the conviction threshold be such that a conviction occurs if and only if
the evidence establishes the defendant’s guilt beyond probability α, where this proba-
bility is computed by Bayes’ Rule using the judge’s prejudice p∗(w) as the prior. The
equilibrium is hence one of rational expectations. We begin with establishing existence.
Lemma 1. A rational expectations equilibrium exists.
7Note that Lemma 1 does not preclude the existence of multiple equilibria. If multi-
ple equilibria exist, then it is obvious that groups that do not diﬀer in their economic
fundamentals could diﬀer in their criminal behavior: One group could simply be in a
low crime equilibrium while the other is in a high crime equilibrium. In order to explain
why groups diﬀer in their equilibria, one could then appeal to a story as in Sah (1991).
If one group had historical reasons to have higher crime rates, say because they were
historically poorer, then diﬀerences in crime rates could persist even after diﬀerences
in the economic fundamentals were eliminated.
Of more interest, however, is that such diﬀerences can arise even when there exists
a unique equilibrium outcome to the model as thus far described. (This, of course,
requires an additional feedback channel, namely from from beliefs to income, which
we will introduce in Section 4.) We therefore continue by ﬁnding a condition for
uniqueness. In order to do so, we deﬁne
λ ≡ f(0)/g(0).
Given our assumptions on f and g, it will be the case that 0 < λ < 1. We then have
the following result:
Lemma 2. If λ ≤ λ, the rational expectations equilibrium is unique.
Below, we will be concerned with how the equilibrium values for p∗(w), q∗(w),
and t∗(w) vary with w. Note that w enters the equilibrium deﬁnition directly only
in condition (3), i.e. the condition stating that the agent’s crime decision be optimal.
Suppressing the dependence on w, this condition is
q = [1 − F(t) − λ(1 − G(t))]∆.
Intuitively, we expect q to increase in ∆ and decrease in t. Note that 1−F(t)−λ(1−
G(t)) is weakly decreasing in t if and only if λ ≤ f(t)/g(t). Since f(t)/g(t) is increasing
by assumption, if λ ≤ λ then 1 − F(t) − λ(1 − G(t)) is non-increasing for all t. For all
λ ≤ λ, we therefore get
λ ≤ λ ⇒
∂
∂t
q = [−f(t) + λg(t)]∆ ≤ 0. (5)
Thus, if λ ≤ λ, an increase in the conviction threshold t indeed leads to a decrease in
the decision threshold q of the agent. Furthermore, since 1 − F(1) − λ(1 − G(1)) = 0,
we have
λ ≤ λ ⇒
∂
∂∆
q = 1 − F(t) − λ(1 − G(t)) = −
Z 1
t
[−f(s) + λg(s)] ds ≥ 0. (6)
Thus, if λ ≤ λ, an increase in the potential penalty ∆ leads to an increase in the
decision threshold q of the agent.
8These preliminary observations allow us to characterize the equilibrium further. In
particular, we will state several results concerning prejudice. We call an equilibrium
biased against lower types if
w > w0 ⇒ p∗(w) < p∗(w0), t∗(w) > t∗(w0), and q∗(w) > q∗(w0).
That is, the judge is prejudiced in favor of higher types and applies a higher conviction
threshold to higher types, and higher types are less likely to commit a crime. Similarly,
an equilibrium biased against higher types if the reverse inequalities hold:
w > w0 ⇒ p∗(w) > p∗(w0), t∗(w) < t∗(w0), and q∗(w) < q∗(w0).
Finally, if p∗, q∗ and t∗ are constant, the equilibrium is unbiased. hold:
w > w0 ⇒ p∗(w) > p∗(w0), t∗(w) < t∗(w0), and q∗(w) < q∗(w0).
Finally, if p∗, q∗ and t∗ are constant, the equilibrium is unbiased.
3 Penalties and Equilibrium Bias
We begin with a general result concerning the potential bias that can arise in equilib-
rium. (As before, we assume that the defendant’s income w is exogenously given and
observed by the jury.)
Lemma 3. Suppose 0 < λ ≤ λ, and let (p∗,q∗,t∗) be the unique equilibrium. The
equilibrium is (i) biased against higher types when ∆ strictly decreases in w, (ii) biased
against lower types when ∆ strictly increases in w, and is (iii) unbiased if ∆ is constant.
With this result in mind, we are now ready to compare diﬀerent forms of punishment
with respect to whether they lead to biased equilibria or not, and if they do, whether
the bias is against lower types or against higher types. In our analysis, punishments
diﬀer only in terms the utility loss ∆(w), they impose on defendants of type w. The
following results are therefore all direct consequences of Lemma 3.
We begin by describing the general penalty schedule that leads to unbiased equi-
libria. By Lemma 3, the equilibrium is unbiased if ∆ is a constant, i.e. ∆(w) = ∆ or
∆0(w) = 0 ∀w:
∆0(w) = u0(w) − (1 − ρ0(w))u0(w − ρ(w)) = 0, (7)
so that unbiasedness requires ρ to satisfy the following diﬀerential equation and initial
condition:




ρ(w) = w − u−1(u(w) − ∆), (9)
9Condition (9) describes the punishment applicable to type w to achieve the desired
utility loss ∆. The diﬀerential equation (9) then describes how to trace out the penalty
schedule ρ that maintains the same utility loss for all types.7 This particular penalty
schedule, given in (9), describes a knife-edge case in that it characterizes those penalties
which lead to unbiased equilibria. Before turning to biased equilibria, we show that
the knife-edge case can be achieved by simple and proportional ﬁnes, respectively, if
the utility function u satisﬁes particular properties:
Theorem 4. The equilibrium is unbiased in the following special cases:
(a) Punishment is by a simple ﬁne and agents are risk-neutral, i.e. u00(w) < 0 ∀w.
(b) Punishment is by a proportional ﬁne and agents have constant relative risk aver-
sion of 1. That is, ρ(w) = γw for some γ ∈ (0,1), and u(w) = alnw + b for
some b and some a > 0.
Let us now consider under which conditions the equilibrium is biased. By Lemma
3, ∆0(w) > 0 implies that the equilibrium will be biased against lower types. We can
therefore derive a condition similar to (9), that is, the equilibrium is biased against
lower types if the penalty schedule satisﬁes




Likewise, it is biased against higher types if the reverse inequality holds,




Of course, given any schedule ρ, it need not be the case that the equilibrium is monotone
in w, as the resulting ∆(w) may not be monotone in w. As far as prison sentences and
simple ﬁnes are concerned, however, we can make the following statement:
Theorem 5. Suppose 0 < λ ≤ λ, and let (p∗,q∗,t∗) be the unique equilibrium.
(a) If punishment for convicted agents is by imprisonment, then (p∗,q∗,t∗) is biased
against lower types.
(b) If punishment for convicted agents is by a simple ﬁne, and agents are strictly risk
averse (i.e. u00(w) < 0 ∀w), then (p∗,q∗,t∗) is biased against higher types.
7Note that (9)–(9) describe the solution to a design problem which is not unlike the classical mech-
anism design problem. Similar to an incentive compatibility constraint, the unbiasedness requirement
leads to a solution in terms of the slope of the design object, and similar to an individual rationality
constraint, the fact that a certain deterrence eﬀect must be created for the lowest type yields an initial
condition.
10In general, the shape of ∆ depends on the shape of the both the utility function
u and the penalty schedule ρ. In the following, we derive suﬃcient conditions for
monotonicity of ∆, and hence for a bias in favor of higher or lower types, respectively.










We can then show that the following holds:
Theorem 6. Suppose punishment for convicted agents is given by penalty schedule ρ.
Suppose 0 < λ ≤ λ, and let (p∗,q∗,t∗) be the unique equilibrium. Then (p∗,q∗,t∗) is
biased against higher types if R(w) > 1 and ε(w) ≤ 1 ∀w, and it is biased against lower
types if R(w) < 1 and ε(w) ≥ 1 ∀w.
Hence, it is possible to extend the result of Theorem 4 (b): In the special case of a
proportional ﬁne, the income elasticity of the ﬁne is zero, i.e. ε(w) = 0. Whether the
equilibrium is biased against lower or higher types depends then only on whether the
coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion R(w) is always below or above one.
It should be noted that, even when the equilibrium is biased, the judges’s preju-
dice is consistent with the true likelihood that agents of various types commit crimes.
Furthermore, in equilibrium agents with diﬀering types take into account that there is
a diﬀerent chance of conviction if they commit a crime than for agents of other types.
For example in the case of imprisonment, the prejudice against an agent is decreasing
with his type, so agents with higher types know that they are more likely to avoid
punishment when committing a crime. However, in equilibrium higher types are still
less likely to commit crime than lower types (i.e. q∗(w) > q∗(w0) if w > w0).
We have thus established conditions for the treatment an individual receives from
the courts to be dependent on their wealth. The story thus far suggests, however, that
people of the same wealth, but that diﬀer in other characteristics, should be treated
the same. In the next section, we allow for income to be determined endogenously, and
ﬁnd that bias in the courts based on wealth can in fact lead to bias based on other
characteristics.
4 Non-economic Types and Statistical Discrimination
In this section, we dispose of the assumption that agents diﬀer in terms of their incomes
w ex-ante. We instead assume that all agents are ex-ante alike with respect to economic
characteristics such as their productivity, human capital, etc., which can inﬂuence a
11person’s income. There are now L ≥ 2 subgroups of the population, and membership
in one group is merely a label l ∈ {1,...,L} without economic signiﬁcance. This label
could be race, gender, nationality, or ethnicity.8 An agent’s group label is publicly
observable, and all diﬀerences in the realized value of an agent’s income are the direct
result of the bias held against the agent’s group in the justice system. If such real
inter-group diﬀerences arise endogenously ex-post, then such outcomes are “sunspot
equilibria.”
To justify the assumption that an agent’s income is a function of prejudice, note
that it may simply be harder for a person who is assumed to be more prone to criminal
behavior to ﬁnd a job, or to ﬁnd a high-paying job, resulting in lower income. This
can be the case for a myriad of reasons. Criminal activity may adversely aﬀect an
individual’s productivity, or criminal activity may directly be targeted at the employer
(e.g. stealing from a job site). Further, if there are training costs for new employees
and employers expect that members of certain groups are more likely to be convicted
of a crime and be sent to jail, then hiring a member of the disadvantaged group has
a larger expected cost because this individual’s duration in employment is on average
shorter. Alternatively, the qualiﬁcations required to be employed at a given wage can
be costly to obtain and training must be paid by the individual in form of tuition or
foregone income while at school. An individual’s decision to acquire these qualiﬁcations
will depend on their expected return, which will be lower for those individuals who are
likely to be incarcerated in the future. We do not focus on any particular such story,
and instead take a reduced form approach. Speciﬁcally, we assume that there is a
weakly decreasing and continuous function v : [0,1] → [w,w] (w < w < ∞) which
describes an agent’s income as a function of the prejudice held against the group to
which he belongs.
Since the only observable diﬀerence between agents is that they belong to diﬀerent
subgroups of the population, replace the prejudice p(w) against persons of income w
by a prejudice pl against persons who belong to group l. Similarly, replace q(w) by ql,





such that for all l ∈ {1,...,L},
p∗
l = 1 − Q(q∗
l ), (10)
q∗
l = [1 − F(t∗
l ) − λ(1 − G(t∗
l )]∆l, (11)
θ(pl,t∗




where ∆l = u(w∗
l ) − u(w∗
l − ρ(w∗
l )) is deﬁned as before. This is essentially the same
8Of course, what we call “non-economic characteristics” can also be a-priori correlated with eco-
nomically meaningful variables. A woman’s productivity as a lumberjack is presumably on average
lower than a man’s, and a French person may on average be a better food critic than a British person.
We assume such cases away in our model.
12set of deﬁning equations as (2)–(4), except that a fourth condition has been added
(condition (13)). This condition states that the equilibrium income level of group l,
w∗
l , must be consistent with the prejudice level p∗
l held against group l. We now say an
equilibrium is biased if there exist l,l0 ∈ {1,...,L} such that p∗
l > p∗
l0. An equilibrium
is unbiased if p∗
1 = ... = p∗
L.
Equilibria can be constructed from the points of intersection of two curves in p-w
space. The ﬁrst curve is the locus of all (p,w) pairs such that p = p∗(w), where p∗(w) is
the equilibrium prejudice against an individual of income w, given by (2) of the simple
model. The second one is the graph of the income function v(p). Let
S = {(p,w) ∈ [0,1] × [w,w] : p = p∗(v(p))}
be the set of all intersecting points of the two curves. An equilibrium in the model with
endogenous income can then be constructed by assigning to each group l ∈ {1,...,L}
a point in S, corresponding to the prejudice p∗
l against group l, and the income level
w∗
l of its members. The conviction threshold applied to defendants from group l, t∗
l
can then be computed from (12), and the decision threshold which agents from group
l use, q∗
l , can be computed from (11).
If S 6= ∅, then an equilibrium exists. The following states a suﬃcient condition for
existence:
Lemma 7. Regardless of the punishment used, if 0 < λ ≤ λ there exists an equilibrium
in the model with endogenous income.
If an equilibrium exists, there is always an unbiased equilibrium, as all groups
can be assigned the same (p,w)-pair. Whenever S contains more than one element,
there are also biased equilibria, as any assignment of groups to (p,w)-pairs contained
in S represents an equilibrium in the extended model. Thus, if |S| > 1, there is an
equilibrium in which p∗
l 6= p∗
l0 for l 6= l0, and also w∗
l 6= w∗
l0, namely if (p∗
l ,w∗
l ) ∈ S and
(p∗
l0,w∗
l0) ∈ S. The following result mirrors Lemma 3.
Lemma 8. Fix w > 0 and w > w. Let D be the set of all continuous, decreasing
functions v : [0,1] → [w,w]. Suppose λ ≤ λ.
(a) If ∆ strictly decreases in w, or is constant, then for all v ∈ D there is a unique
equilibrium, and this equilibrium is unbiased.
(b) If ∆ increases in w, there exists a non-empty set D0 ⊂ D such that for all v ∈ D0,
a biased equilibrium exists.
The next result follows then immediately from Lemma 8 (a proof is therefore omit-
ted):
Theorem 9. Fix w > 0 and w > w. Let D be the set of all continuous, decreasing
functions v : [0,1] → [w,w]. Suppose λ ≤ λ.
13(a) If convicted oﬀenders are punished by a simple ﬁne, then for all v ∈ D there is a
unique equilibrium, and this equilibrium is unbiased.
(b) If convicted oﬀenders are punished by imprisonment, there exists a non-empty set
D0 ⊂ D such that for all v ∈ D0 a biased equilibrium exists.
Figure 2 depicts the case of Theorem 9 (b), where v ∈ D0. It is worth mentioning
that there is nothing “special” about the function v depicted. That is, this result
does not rely on there being any points of tangency or discontinuities, and the set D0
could be loosely be regarded as “generic.”9 In general, there will be a relatively large
number of functions v ∈ D0. With prison as punishment for convicted agents, the
p∗-curve is increasing, and it is not hard to plot a continuous and decreasing v-curve
which intersects the p∗-curve several times. In our example there are three intersections
(|S| = 3), so that one can construct equilibria with up to three diﬀerent endogenous
income levels. We depict an example with two groups: Group 1 earns a relatively high
income w∗
1 and faces a relatively low prejudice p∗
1. The opposite holds for group 2.
In contrast, Figure 3 shows the case of the same v-curve as before, but a simple
ﬁne is used instead of prison to punish convicted agents. This corresponds to Theorem
9 (a). In this case the p∗-curve is strictly increasing, and it is easy to see that there
9A formal deﬁnition of measure in function space is beyond the scope of this paper; however, see
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Figure 2: Biased equilibrium when punishment is by imprisonment
14cannot be multiple intersections of p∗ and v now. Thus the only equilibrium is an
unbiased one, where both groups earn the same income and face the same prejudice.
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Figure 3: Unbiased equilibrium when simple ﬁnes are used
5 Extensions
In this section, we show how our model can be extended by introducing dynamics
(Section 5.1) and the possibility of multiple oﬀenses (Section 5.2). The merits of these
extensions are described in detail below.
5.1 A Dynamic Link from Prejudice to Income
When punishment is by imprisonment, we have shown that there exists a possibility
for discriminatory equilibria, where racial groups diﬀer in terms of their crime rates,
but also in terms of their incomes. This required there to be some feedback from the
(perceived) proclivity to crime of an individual to the individual’s income. We modeled
this feedback in “reduced form” by assuming there be a downward sloping function v
that mapped an individual’s perceived crime rate to income. In equilibrium of such a
model, both membership in a certain racial group, or an individual’s income, can then
explain the likelihood that the individual is convicted of a crime. There is, however,
empirical evidence (cited in the introduction) that race is a signiﬁcant predictor of
criminal activity after controlling for wages and a number of other economic variables.
15In this section, we show that when introducing a temporal dimension to our model,
this empirical observation can be reconciled. In particular, by using expected lifetime
earnings as the relevant income variable, we show that the sanctions imposed by the
courts on convicted criminals can be directly responsible for diﬀerences in lifetime
earnings.
Suppose employers oﬀer (voluntarily or by law) the same wage to everybody, as
long as they possess the same economically relevant qualiﬁcations, such as academic
degrees or technical diplomas. However, members of one group are more likely to spend
some time of their lives in prison than others. They will hence receive the same wage
as everybody else when they work, but over a stochastically shorter period of time. For
simplicity, assume that only life sentences are given. Then individuals who face a strong
prejudice on average will go to jail sooner—thus their expected lifetime earnings they
stand to lose from the sentence are lower, compared to individuals who face a lesser
prejudice. Consequently, they are less likely to be deterred by the threat of losing this
expected future income, and more likely to commit crimes, making this an equilibrium
again. The diﬀerence is now that a worker’s per-period wage income has no predictive
power regarding criminal activity, but membership in racial groups has. Furthermore,
it is not discrimination in the labor market, but the criminal justice system itself, that
provides the causal link between prejudice and income. If wage diﬀerences exist that
are due to diﬀerential treatment by employers, aﬃrmative action that mandates non-
discriminatory treatment in the labor market could help eliminate this problem (similar
to the argument made by Coate and Loury (1993)). However, in the case we consider
here, such policies will have no eﬀect at best, as employers pay the same wage to all
workers already.
We assume that agents live for inﬁnitely many periods. At the beginning of each
period, an agent will work and earn a ﬁxed wage of y, unless he is in prison in which
case he earns zero. There is no saving technology, and all income is consumed in the
period it is earned. At the end of each period, the events described in Section 2 unfold:
Agents observe their η-shocks and decide whether to commit the crime or not (the
η-draws are assumed i.i.d. across agents and time), and must possibly stand trial. At
the end of the period, the agent is then either a convicted criminal or not. If an agent is
convicted (rightfully or wrongfully), he is removed from employment and sentenced to
life in prison. This sentence represents a permanent reduction in income.10 Otherwise,
the agent starts the next period as a working individual. In computing their expected
lifetime earnings, agents apply a common discount factor β < 1 and do not include
the future realizations of η. This is a behavioral assumption, of course, but unless η
is literally regarded as the material beneﬁt from a crime (for instance money stolen),
this assumption seems not unreasonable. For example, one interpretation of η is that
10We expect that the results we derive continue to hold for suﬃciently long but ﬁnite prison sentences,
as the crucial feature of this penalty is not so much the duration of time over which it is applied, but
that it reduces the agent’s lifetime income to a ﬁxed level.
16it represents the short-lived “kick” an individual gets from the crime. For oﬀenses such
as the consumption of illegal substances, it seems very natural to impose such a strong
bias for the presence regarding the beneﬁt η.
To solve this model, note that at the time the agent has observed the current
period’s value of η and must decide whether or not to commit a crime, the expected
lifetime consumption for an agent from the next period on, conditional on entering the






ξ(q,t) = [1 − Q(q)]F(t) + Q(q)[1 − λ(1 − G(t))]
is the period-to-period “survival probability” associated with the tuple (q,t). Since a
given value for p pins down (q,t) via (2)–(4), we can write v as a function of p, as
in (14). When an individual decides whether or not to commit a crime, the relevant
utilities he must consider correspond to the prospect of earning zero from the next
period onward (if convicted), or earning an expected continuation utility v(p) from the
next period onward. Hence we deﬁne




We now show that this dynamic model can give rise to a discriminatory equilibrium,
even though in this equilibrium every worker earns the same ﬁxed wage y. To show
that this can happen, we use an example using the following parameter values:
y = 1, α = 0.95, β = 0.95, λ = 0.01, η ∼ U[0,5], F(t) = t2, G(t) = 2t − t2.
Note that this is not entirely in line with some of our previous assumptions; for instance
f(0) = 0 and η is bounded in this example. However, those assumptions were made
earlier because they were suﬃcient to ensure equilibria existed and had the properties
we identiﬁed. They are not necessary, however, and our example illustrates that the
same biased outcomes can also arise in other cases were the assumptions are violated.
We compute the v(p) and p∗(w) numerically. The result is plotted in Figure 4.
One can see that there are in fact three intersections of the two curves. Thus, if
there are two or more racial (or otherwise distinguishable) groups in the population,
whose members all earn y = 1 when not incarcerated, biased equilibria can arise simply
because two diﬀerent groups can be “assigned” diﬀerent prejudice-lifetime income pairs
which correspond to the intersections in Figure 4.
This dynamic model provides an explanation for why some individuals choose to
live a “life of crime,” and why this choice may be correlated with characteristics such
as race. Consider an individual in the high crime/low lifetime income group. Each





Figure 4: Numerical example (v(p) is expected discounted lifetime income)
is distributed equally across the entire population, against the expected cost. The
expected cost is that the individual (with some probability) loses his criminal career
and goes to jail. However, continuing a life of crime is not a very enticing prospect
either, because a career criminal expects to be jailed sooner or later anyways. Hence,
such a person is less likely to be deterred by this prospect. The opposite holds for the
choice to live a low-crime life, and the usual stereotyping argument can be made to
sort individuals into diﬀerent such equilibria, based on their race or other observable
characteristics. The crucial aspect here is that, because race is observable and cannot
be altered, it is not possible for individuals to break out of the high-crime equilibrium—
they would be treated in an adverse manner by the courts even if they decided not to
commit crime ever. Note that this result relies on the diﬀerence in the deterrence eﬀect
that long prison sentence have for members of the diﬀerent subgroups. The same story
could not be told in an alternative framework where instead of the cost of crime the
beneﬁt was diﬀerent across groups (as would be the case, for example, if we focused on
property crime and assumed that poorer individuals could gain more from stealing).
5.2 Multiple Oﬀenses and Escalating Sanctions
In this section, we drop the interaction with the labor market. That is, we now consider
individuals without regard to their income or wealth. As in Section 4, we consider L ≥ 2
subgroups of the population, where members of these subgroups do not diﬀer in any
meaningful way. The timing is as before, with the exception that, when agents decide
18whether to commit a crime, they do so knowing that there is a probability they may be
(falsely) convicted of some other crime as well11. Thus an individual may be convicted
of zero, one or two crimes.
As before, we consider the utility costs of the penalties, although we no longer
consider them as a function of the individual’s wealth. Deﬁne the utility cost from
the ﬁrst penalty as ∆1, and the utility cost of the second penalty as ∆2. Thus, if an
individual is convicted of a single crime, the penalty in terms of utility is ∆1, and if an
individual is convicted of two crimes, the total utility cost is ∆1 + ∆2.
Let m1 denote the probability that an individual is convicted of a crime that they
did commit, and let m0 denote the probability that the same individual is (wrongfully)
convicted of a crime they did not commit. As before, if the agent does not commit a
crime, there is a chance, m0, that the agent will still be convicted and pay a penalty.
If the agent does commit a crime, there is now a chance, m0m1, that they will be
convicted of two crimes. The crime is committed if and only if the beneﬁt from doing
so exceeds its cost:
η > q ≡ m1 [(1 − m0)∆1 + m0∆2].
As before, the probability of conviction following a crime is given by
m1 = P[θ(t) ≥ α|d = 1] = P[t ≥ t|d = 1] = 1 − F(t),
and the probability of wrongful conviction is
m0 = λP[θ(t) ≥ α|d = 0] = λP[t ≥ t|d = 0] = λ(1 − G(t)).
Given the diﬀerence in the expected cost of committing a crime, we now have
that the tuple (p∗,q∗,t∗) constitutes an equilibrium if it solves the following system of
equations:
p∗ = 1 − Q(q∗) (15)
q∗ = [1 − F(t∗)][(1 − λ(1 − G(t∗)))∆1 + λ(1 − G(t∗))∆2] (16)
θ(t∗) = α (17)
where equations (15) – (17) have the same interpretation as before. Note that only
(16) is diﬀerent, but it still is continuous with compact domain, and so the proof to
the previous existence lemma applies here as well.
Lemma 10. A rational expectations equilibrium exists.
Before, we found that the equilibrium was unique as long as q∗ was decreasing in
t∗. Examining equation (16) yields
∂q
∂t
= −f(t)[(1 − λ(1 − G(t)))∆1 + λ(1 − G(t))∆2] + [1 − F(t)][λg(t)(∆1 − ∆2)]
= −f(t)∆1 + λ[[1 − G(t)]f(t) + [1 − F(t)]g(t)][∆1 − ∆2] (18)
11This other crime may be either a crime that was actually committed be someone else, or another
activity undertaken by the individual that has been incorrectly interpreted as a criminal act.
19and we have proved the following lemma:
Lemma 11. The rational expectations equilibrium is unique when ∆2 > ∆1.
When the equilibrium is not unique, stereotyping equilibria are possible, as was
depicted previously in Figure 2. As long as second penalties are more severe in their
utility costs, crime rates are uniquely determined across subgroups and there will be no
stereotyping equilibrium. It should be noted that, with respect to ﬁnes, the utility cost
of punishment is increasing (∆2 > ∆1) even when the amount of the ﬁne is independent
of the number of convictions because of diminishing marginal utility. However, with
prison, the second conviction is likely to be less severe. Possible reasons for this include
discounting (a second penalty occurs after the ﬁrst has been served) and a general loss of
social status, and perhaps employment and marital status as well, that occurs after the
ﬁrst conviction. As a result, if incarceration is used as punishment, prison terms that
increase in the number of convictions would be desirable. Note that this provides an
additional rationale for increasing (or at least non-decreasing) penalties, to complement
the work of Emons (2006) and Stigler (1970). Note that even when the equilibrium is
unique, it is still possible for groups that vary in non-economic characteristics (such as
race) to diﬀer in their crime rates through the mechanism described in section 4.
6 Conclusion
We developed a model that tied jury prejudice, the decision to commit crime, and
conviction standards into a single framework. Within this framework, we were able to
characterize the eﬀects of diﬀerent penalty forms, such as prison sentences or mone-
tary sanctions, on beliefs and thus also on behavior. Making prejudice (i.e. beliefs)
endogenous in the model allowed us to develop from it a theory of discrimination based
on non-economic characteristics such as race. We now conclude the paper with a cou-
ple of remarks, concerning the implications of the paper and possible areas of further
research.
First, our results have implications for the design, or reform, of criminal justice
systems. We have compared the diﬀerent eﬀects of prison and monetary sentences on
prejudice; the former being more likely to invite stereotyping than the latter. We do
not intend to give a thorough survey of the advantages and disadvantages of ﬁnes vs.
prison sentences here. Nevertheless, we think our model has something to say about
the various forms of penalizing felonies such as minor drug oﬀenses. In the U.S. such
crimes are routinely punished by incarceration, while European countries tend to use
ﬁnes. The example of drug oﬀenses is particularly interesting, as drug-related crime
is responsible for a large fraction of the U.S. prison population12. In addition, those
12About 55% of Federal inmates in 2003 and 25% of state level inmates were incarcerated for drug-
related oﬀenses. Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics Prisoners in 2004, NCJ 210677, October 2005.
20convicted for drug-related oﬀenses are disproportionately Black or Hispanic13. If the
possibility of statistical discrimination is a concern to those who draft sentencing laws,
then the relationship between diﬀerent forms of penalties and the eﬀects they have on
crime and prejudice should be taken seriously.
Second, note that our model (with prison sentences) produced two related phenom-
ena: In the static version, sunspot equilibria could emerge in which people were treated
diﬀerently by the courts based on their race. In such equilibria, the group which faced
a less favorable judicial prejudice was also ex-post economically disadvantaged. In the
dynamic version of Section 5.1, we constructed an example that possessed a similar
sunspot equilibrium; however, the group with the less favorable prejudice was disad-
vantaged only in terms of their lifetime earnings, and not in terms of their per-period
earnings when at work. Obviously, a more elaborate model can be conceived in which
both aspects arise: The disadvantaged racial group has on average lower wages than
the advantaged one, for the reasons mentioned in the text, but race has residual pre-
dictive power of criminal activity. This pattern exists very clearly in the data (see the
references cited in the introduction), and we regard the lifetime income model as a
promising theoretical framework in which to explore this issue further.
Finally, we have shown that the model can be extended to multiple oﬀenses and
more complex penalty schedules which are functions of the number of previous convic-
tions. Examining the eﬀects of escalating sanctions in the dynamic model is likely to
produce interesting results. One rationale for escalating sanctions is that convicted of-
fenders can be of two types: Those who are corrigible (and deserve a “second chance”)
and those who are not (and from which the public should be protected). A person
convicted of multiple oﬀenses is more likely to belong to the second category; hence the
increasing sentences for repeat oﬀenders.14 It appears that in a dynamic model, where
crime decisions are based on lifetime expected income, the number of prior convictions
could serve a similar role as race in our model: If persons with prior convictions face
an unfavorable prejudice in the legal system, then they may be more likely to commit
crimes, which may make them appear to be incorrigible. Exploring this possibility is
another question left for future research.
13Blacks and Hispanics represented 24% and 23% of those convicted for drug-related oﬀenses in 2003,
compared to 14% Whites. Source: Prisoners in 2005, NCJ 215092, November 2006.
14An alternative justiﬁcation for escalating sanctions is given in Emons (2006).
21Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. To prove an equilibrium exists, we make a standard ﬁxed point
argument. Fix any w and deﬁne three maps,
T1 : q → p : [0,∞) → [0,1],
T w
2 : t → q : [0,1] → [0,∞),
T3 : p → t : (0,1) → [0,1]
by (2), (3) (given w), and (4), respectively; these are all given in Section 2.5. Note
that T1, T w
2 and T3 are continuous on their respective domains. T3 is well-deﬁned
through (4) on (0,1) only; however it can be extended continuously to [0,1] by setting
T3(0) = 1 and T3(1) = 0. Further, as T w
2 is continuous on a compact domain, its image
is bounded. We can hence restrict the range of T w
2 , as well as the domain of T1, to
[0, ˆ q(w)] for suﬃciently large ˆ q(w). Now deﬁne a new map
T w : [0,1] × [0, ˆ q(w)] × [0,1] → [0,1] × [0, ˆ q(w)] × [0,1]
by
T w(p,q,t) = (T1(q),T w
2 (t),T3(p)).
Since T w maps a compact subset of R3 into itself, we can apply Brouwer’s ﬁxed point
theorem to show, for given w, there exists (p∗(w),q∗(w),t∗(w)) such that
(p∗(w),q∗(w),t∗(w)) = T w(p∗(w),q∗(w),t∗(w));
thus it solves (2)–(4) simultaneously. Since such a ﬁxed point can be constructed for
each w independently, an equilibrium as deﬁned above exists.
Proof of Lemma 2. To prove uniqueness, let λ ≤ λ and suppose there are two equilibria,
(p∗,q∗,t∗) 6= (e p∗, e q∗,e t∗). Thus there exists w such that q∗(w) 6= e q∗(w) (otherwise
p∗(w) = e p∗(w) ∀w by (2), which implies t∗(w) = e t∗(w) ∀w, by (4), but then the
equilibrium would be unique). So suppose, without loss of generality, that q∗(w) >
e q∗(w) for some w. Condition (2) then implies p∗(w) < e p∗(w), and using (4) we have
t∗(w) > e t∗(w). If λ ≤ λ then using (5) we get q∗(w) ≤ e q∗(w), a contradiction. Hence
the equilibrium is unique if λ ≤ λ.
Proof of Lemma 3. Let w > w0 and suppose ∆(w) > ∆(w0). If p(w) ≥ p(w0), then by
condition (2), q(w) ≤ q(w0). However, by condition (4) and the fact that f/g increases,
we have t(w) ≤ t(w0). Thus if ∆(w) > ∆(w0) then (5)–(6) imply q(w) > q(w0),
which is a contradiction, and therefore p(w) < p(w0). From (4) it follows then that
t(w) > t(w0), and from (2) it follows that q(w) > q(w0). Exactly the opposite argument
can be made when w > w0 and ∆(w) < ∆(w0). Finally, when ∆ is a constant then
(3) is independent of w so that p∗, q∗, and t∗ are constant and hence constitute an
unbiased equilibrium.
22Proof of Theorem 4. If u00(w) = 0, then ∆0(w) = u0(w) − u0(w − δ) = 0, and Lemma 3
(iii) implies (a). If ρ(w) = γw and u(w) = alnw + b, then ∆0(w) = a/w − a/w = 0,
and Lemma 3 (iii) implies (b) as well.
Proof of Theorem 5. In case of imprisonment, ∆(w) = u(w) − u0, which is strictly
increasing in w since u0(w) > 0. Applying Lemma 3 (ii) yields (a). In case of a ﬁne,
∆(w) = u(w) − u(w − δ), which is strictly decreasing in w if u00(w) < 0 ∀w. Applying
Lemma 3 (i) yields (b).











= u0(γw) + γwu00(γw) < 0 ∀γ. (19)
Let µ(w) = w − ρ(w) be the income left to the individual after the ﬁne ρ(w). Since
µ(w) < w, (19) implies
µ(w)
w
u0(µ(w)) = u0(w) −
Z 1
µ(w)/w
γu0(γw)dγ > u0(w). (20)
Suppose now that ε(w) ≤ 1 ∀w: wρ0(w)/ρ(w) ≤ 1. Multiplying this inequality by
ρ(w)/w yields ρ0(w) ≤ ρ(w)/w, and expressing the ﬁne as ρ(w) = w − µ(w) we get










By Lemma 3 (i), therefore, the equilibrium is biased against higher types. Analogous
steps can be repeated for R(w) < 1 and ε(w) ≥ 1, in which case ∆0(w) > 0 and the
equilibrium is biased against lower types by Lemma 3 (ii).
Proof of Lemma 7. If S 6= ∅, then an unbiased equilibrium exists, as argued in the text.
We have to show that S 6= ∅. Note that v is a continuous function mapping p ∈ [0,1]
to w ∈ [w,w]. From the simple model with exogenous income diﬀerences we borrow
the the map p∗, a correspondence which assigns to income levels w ∈ [w,∞) prejudice
levels p ∈ [0,1]. If λ ≤ λ, p∗(w) is single-valued by Lemma 1. As ∆ is continuous
in w regardless of the punishment used, w enters the mapping T deﬁned in the proof
of Lemma 1 continuously, which implies that p∗ is upper-hemicontinuous. But then
p∗ can equivalently be expressed as a continuous function from [w,∞) to [0,1]. This
implies that in [0,1] × [,w], the graphs of these functions intersect at least once, so
S 6= ∅.
23Proof of Lemma 8. In the proof of Theorem 7 we already established that p∗ is a con-
tinuous function from [w,∞) → [0,1]. We ﬁrst prove (a). Lemma 3 (i), p∗ strictly
increases for strictly decreasing ∆. Therefore, for each v ∈ D there is exactly one
w ∈ [0,1] such that v(p∗(w)) = w. If ∆ is constant, then by Lemma 3 (iii) p∗ is
constant. It will hence become a vertical line in p-w space, which is intersected by
any decreasing, continuous v exactly once. Hence |S| = 1 and a unique, unbiased
equilibrium exists. To prove (b), note that by Lemma 3 (ii) p∗ strictly decreases for
strictly increasing ∆. Therefore, there exists a non-empty set of continuous, decreasing
functions v : [0,1] → [w,w] for which the following holds: There exists w1,w2 ∈ [w,w],
w1 6= w2, such that v(p∗(w1)) = w1 and v(p∗(w2)) = w2. For all such v, |S| > 1 and a
biased equilibrium exists.
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